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Abstract: the beginning of modern history and the sub-
sequent war in Bosnia and Herzegovina coincide with the 
institutional beginnings of the european union common 
foreign and security policy. at that time, europe did not 
have a single position, nor could it have achieved a political 
consensus on any issue. in addition, it lacked appropriate 
instruments, as well as readiness and willingness to ac-
tively engage to put an end to war in BiH. the war in BiH 
was stopped, however, thanks to the efforts of the united 
states. this was a crucial moment for europe to modify its 
common foreign and security policy. the european union 
has passed a thorny path of establishing common foreign 
and security policy. on this path, however, the eu has 
experienced some progress and achieved good results, al-
though not sufficient, just as BiH has made some progress 
in reforms. in order for BiH to joint the family of modern 
democratic countries, it will need a stronger engagement 
of the european union and its more decisive common 
foreign and security policy, because only together we 
can cope with global challenges. Peace and prosperity in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina will also help build free and stable 
europe.
Keywords: Bosnia and Herzegovina, european union, 
common Foreign and security Policy, nato, united 
states, international community, reforms.
Resumen: el comienzo de la historia moderna y la guerra 
posterior en Bosnia y Herzegovina coinciden con los ini-
cios institucionales de la Política exterior y de seguridad 
común de la unión europea. en ese momento, europa 
no tenía una posición única, ni podría haber logrado un 
consenso político sobre ningún tema. además, carecía de 
los instrumentos adecuados, así como de la disposición 
y la voluntad de comprometerse activamente para po-
ner fin a la guerra en Bosnia y Herzegovina. sin embar-
go, la guerra en Bosnia y Herzegovina se detuvo gracias 
a los esfuerzos de los estados unidos. Fue un momento 
crucial para que europa modificase su Política exterior y 
de seguridad común. La unión europea ha recorrido un 
camino difícil para establecer esta política. a largo de este 
camino, la ue ha experimentado algún progreso y logrado 
buenos resultados, aunque no es suficiente. igualmente 
Bosnia y Herzegovina ha hecho algún progreso con sus re-
formas jurídicas internas para unirse así a la familia de los 
países democráticos modernos. necesitará, no obstante, 
un mayor compromiso de la ue y una Pesc más decisiva 
para poder hacer frente a los desafíos globales. La paz y la 
prosperidad en Bosnia y Herzegovina también ayudarán a 
construir una europa libre y estable.
Palabras clave: Bosnia y Herzegovina, unión europea, 
Política exterior y de seguridad común, otan, estado 
unidos, la comunidad internacional, reformas
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introduction
F ollowing the dissolution of the Soviet union and the end of the Cold War, the world entered a new stage in the development of international relations, marked by the transition from the bipolar system to unipolar 1 
[which increasingly takes on the appearance of a multipolar one] and in which 
a large number of states have begun to redefine their national and security 
interests, taking into account the changed geopolitical and geoeconomic en-
vironment. 2 new, powerful, primarily non-state actors, both in the sphere of 
politics and economy, as well as in the sphere of security, have boldly stepped 
onto the world scene. 3 All of these changes have been further supported by, 
and also accelerated by the globalization, which had its true momentum at the 
end of the 20th century and the beginning of the new millennium. 4
The beginning of the latest 5 history of Bosnia and Herzegovina coincides 
with contemporary development of international relations. 6 The modern his-
tory of BiH could be marked by the period from its independence in relation 
to the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 7 and its recognition by 
1 rauthammer, Ch., The Unipolar Moment, Foreign Affairs, vol. 70, no. 1, 1991, p. 17; and 
Fettweis, Ch., Sir Halford Mackinder, Geopolitics, and Policymaking in the 21st Century, u.S. Army 
War College, vol. 30, issue 2, 2000, pp. 223-245.
2 chomski, n., Stari i novi svjetski poretci, Zagreb, naklada Jesenski i Turk, 2004, pp. 3-56.
3 Bremmer, i., The end of the free market: who wins the war between states and corporations?, new 
York, Portfolio, 2010, pp. 54-67.
4 duraković, n., Međunarodni odnosi, Fakultet političkih nauka, Pravni fakultet, Sarajevo, 2009, 
pp. 33-58. 
5 The emphasis on the latest history of Bosnia and Herzegovina is not without reason. namely, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is a country with almost a thousand-year history, as evidenced, inter 
alia, by the Charter of Kulin Ban of 1189. By this Charter, the then sovereign of the Bos-
nian state ban Kulin guaranteed to the Dubrovnik traders the safe movement and trade in his 
country. The Charter of Kulin Ban is the oldest preserved diplomatic document of a medieval 
Bosnian state that is commonly referred to as the birth certificate of Bosnian statehood. For 
more information, see: imamović, E., Korijeni Bosne i Bosanstva, Sarajevo, Međunarodni centar 
za mir, 1995. imamović, E., Šta za Bosnu znači Povelja Kulina bana, http://ins.ba/bs/article/1313/
dr-enver-imamovic-sta-za-bosnu-znaci-povelja-kulina-bana, accessed 10 March 2018. 
6 LjuBijankić, i., «new world order and Bosnia and Herzegovina», Journal of Muslim Minority 
Affairs, 1996, Editorial, p. 12
7 on March 1, 1992, 99.44% of Bosnians and Herzegovinians out of 2,073,568 citizens who went 
to the referendum on the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, declared themselves for 
the sovereign and independent state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, i.e. independent in relation to 
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Shortly thereafter, a brutal aggression on Bosnia 
and Herzegovina began in which more than 100,000 Bosniaks lost their lives, between 35,000 
and 50,000 Bosniak girls and women were raped, and 1,600 children were killed just in Sarajevo 
during the siege of the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina that lasted 1425 days. 
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the international community as an independent and sovereign state in 1992 
to the most recent days. During this period, BiH has undergone significant 
restructuring in its political and constitutional-legal system as compared to its 
former political history and legal constitution. 8
The aggression 9 against BiH began shortly after the recognition of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina by the international community and the united 
nations. From 1992 to 1994, the European union tried to stop the war in 
BiH by various diplomatic means, including international peace conferences 
that were all unsuccessful. This lasted until the beginning of 1994 when 
the uS Administration led by the then President Bill Clinton 10 undertook 
a diplomatic initiative to resolve the Bosnian issue, which resulted in the 
establishment of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Wash-
ington Agreement of March 31, 1994 and the following year by the Dayton 
Agreement which was concluded on 21 november 1995 in the united States 
and signed in Paris on December 14, the same year, which ended a brutal 
four-year aggression. 11
Dayton Peace Agreement marked the end of war, but at the same time, 
it signified the beginning of troubles for Bosnia and Herzegovina, and its so-
cio-political and legal constitution, as well as internal and external integra-
tion of the state. 12 Bosnia and Herzegovina underwent multiple transitions, 
from war to peace, from planned to market economy, and from one-party to 
multi-party system. The post-Dayton period of BiH, that is, the period since 
8 GLenny, M., The Fall of Yugoslavia, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1996, pp. 82-177.
9 it is very common to read that the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the early 1990s, was a 
civil war. True, Bosnia and Serbia were once republics that, together with, Slovenia, Croatia, 
Montenegro, Macedonia, Kosovo and Macedonia, constituted one state – the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia. However, when the Yugoslav People’s Army and paramilitary units of 
Serbia carried out a military attack on Bosnia and Herzegovina, it was already an independent 
and internationally recognized state. in other words, the war in Bosnia in Herzegovina was the 
classical aggression of the state of Serbia against the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it was an 
interstate, not a civil war. For more information see imamović, M., Agresija na Bosnu i Hercego-
vinu i borba za njen opstanak: 1992-1995, Pravni fakultet univerziteta u Sarajevu, Sarajevo, 1997, 
p. 354.
10 ButFoy, A., «The Rise and Fall of Missile Diplomacy? President Clinton and the ‘Revolution 
in military affairs’», in Retrospect, Australian Journal of Politics and History, Blackwell Publishing, 
Boston, 2006, pp. 112-145.
11 BurG, S. L., The War in Bosnia and Herzegovina: ethnic conflict and international intervention, Ar-
monk, M.E. Sharpe, new York, 1998, pp. 82-90.
12 BeLLoni, R., «Civil Society and Peace Building in Bosnia and Herzegovina», Journal of Peace 
Research 38, international Peace Research institute, oslo, March 2001, pp. 34-83.
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the signing of the Dayton Agreement to date, has been marked by reform 
processes, democratization of society, building of democratic institutions and 
the establishment of political pluralism. in these processes, international com-
munity had played a key role. no reform in the post-Dayton life of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina was carried out without the influence and engagement of the 
international community, which was crucial for the preservation of territorial 
integrity, sovereignty, international subjectivity and political independence of 
BiH. 13
The irresponsible Bosnian-Herzegovinian political elite could not reach 
political agreement on the largest number of issues. Consequently, legal solu-
tions and decisions were made and laws imposed by the High Representa-
tive in Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially with regard to laws regulating or 
establishing central state institutions. The engagement of the international 
community was crucial for the internal and external integration and economic 
reconstruction of the country.
However, everything that has been done so far by the international 
community in Bosnia and Herzegovina is unfortunately not nearly enough 
for Bosnia and Herzegovina to join the family of modern European coun-
tries where it belongs. 14 namely, the Dayton Agreement ended the war, but 
unfortunately a functional state was not established. «Richard Holbrooke, 
who worked on the Dayton Agreement, endeavoured to stop the war. This 
agreement was not meant to establish a functioning European economy.» 15 
The best testimony on what the Dayton Agreement meant for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina at the time of its signing, and what it means today is given 
by the former High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Wolfgang 
Petritsch «At the time of the signing, it [the Dayton Agreement] was a «the 
rescue belt» of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and has long since become a «mad 
shirt». 16
in order for Bosnia and Herzegovina to move along the path of mod-
ern, democratic Western European countries, or to become a modern Eu-
ropean state, in which the efficient functioning of state institutions will be 
13 pejanović, M., Politički razvoj Bosne i Hercegovine u postdejtonskom periodu, Sarajevo, october 
2005, pp. 70-200.
14 noWak, M., Bosna i Hercegovina na putu ka modernoj državi? Perspektive i prepreke – Neuspjeh 
Daytona? Fondacija Heinrich Boll, Sarajevo, 2005, pp. 102-190.
15 interview by Richard Sclar, Dnevni avazi, 21 october 2004. 
16 petritsch, W., Večernji list, 28 January 2005. 
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established, it is necessary to adopt European standards in the political, 
economic and social spheres. 17 Bearing in mind the fact that, over the past 
twenty years, the irresponsible BiH political establishment has shown, to 
a lesser or greater extent, unpreparedness for reforms, this goal can only 
be achieved with a stronger engagement of the European union through 
a more determined foreign and security policy towards Bosnia and Herze-
govina.
1. common ForeiGn and security poLicy oF the eu and the 
BeGinninG oF War in Bosnia and herzeGovina
The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina seems to have occurred at the wrong 
time, too early for Europe to take decisive steps to stop the bloodshed. name-
ly, at the beginning of the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 
European Economic Community (EEA) was transformed into the European 
union by the Maastricht Treaty 18 signed on February 7, 1992. [The Agree-
ment entered into force on november 1, 1993]. The same Treaty established 
common Eu foreign and security policy as the second pillar of the Treaty, 
including the possible development of a common defence policy, which would 
eventually result in the formation of a joint defence.
17 russ, B., «Can foreigners fix Bosnia?», Christian Science Monitor, 19 September 2003, p. 67.
18 The Maastricht Treaty specifies in detail the actions of member states in the framework of 
common foreign and security policy. it thus states that member states will inform and con-
sult each other within the Council in relation to all matters relating to foreign and security 
policy of general interest, and the Council will, whenever deems necessary, define a common 
policy. Member States will ensure the coherence of national policies with common positions 
that they will protect in international organizations and international conferences. it further 
states that member states will support the union’s foreign and security policy, actively and 
unconditionally, in the spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity, and will refrain from any activity 
that is contrary to the interests of the union or could lessen its effectiveness as cohesive power 
in international relations. Regarding the security policy, Article J.4 of the Treaty defines that 
the task of the West European union (WEu) is to elaborate and implement the decisions and 
actions of the union relating to the defence but will not prejudice the specific character of the 
security and defence policies of the member states, that it will respect their obligations within 
the nATo alliance, and that it will be compatible with the common security and defence 
policy defined in this framework. For more information see Council of the European Com-
munities (1992), Treaty on European union, Luxembourg: office for official Publications 
of the European Communities available at https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/
files/docs/body/treaty_on_european_union_en.pdf.
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The main objectives of the common foreign and security policy, drafted 
and implemented by both the European Council, 19 and all Member States are 
as follows:
– «Protection of common values, fundamental interests and independ-
ence of the union;
– Strengthening the security of the union and its Member States by all 
means;
– Preserving peace and strengthening international security in accord-
ance with the principles of the un Charter, the principles of the Hel-
sinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter;
– improvement of international cooperation;
– Development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law, and 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.» 20
The Maastricht Treaty has introduced another novelty: a consen-
sus-based ‘joint action’ that will make co-operation among member states in 
the area of common foreign and security policy more effective. Joint action 
implies implementation of common, agreed Eu policies. 21
The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European union is 
the area in which Eu Member States have been, from the very beginning, 
facing the greatest, and the most serous challenges. The reason lies primarily 
in the fact that Member States reluctantly renounce their own sovereignty 22 
19 The Treaty specifies that the diplomatic and consular missions of the Member States and the 
Delegation of the Commission in third countries and international conferences and their rep-
resentatives in international organizations will work together to ensure respect for and imple-
mentation of common positions and measures adopted by the Council. Council of the European 
Communities (1992), Treaty on European union, Luxembourg: office for official Publications 
of the European Communities, Article J.6, p 129, available at https://europa.eu/european-un-
ion/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/treaty_on_european_union_en.pdf.
20 Council of the European Communities (1992), Treaty on European union, Luxembourg: of-
fice for official Publications of the European Communities, pp. 126,7, available at https://eu-
ropa.eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/treaty_on_european_union_en.pdf.
21 Gordon, Ph.H. (1997/8), EU’s Uncommon Foreign Policy, The MiT Press, international Securi-
ty, vol. 22, no. 3 (Winter 1997-1998), p. 82.
22 The legal system of the European union is designed in a way that each member state renounces 
a part of the sovereignty in favour of transnational European institutions. With the enlargement 
and strengthening of the European union, the areas in which policies were drafted and decisions 
were made at the level of European union institutions also increased. Today, European union 
institutions have exclusive competence in the field of: customs union, functioning of the internal 
market, monetary policy, conservation of marine biological resources, fishery, and trade. There 
are a number of areas in which Eu institutions share competence with member states such 
as: economic, social and territorial cohesion, agriculture, environment, consumer protection, 
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in order to strengthen common policies in the areas of greatest importance 
for their own countries – security and foreign affairs – not necessarily taking 
into account economic issues that undoubtedly occupy the highest place in the 
national priorities. 23 The second reason lies in the fact that every Eu member 
state has its own history, tradition, as well as national, foreign and security 
interests, which are often not mutually compatible or, worse, contradictory. it 
is precisely these policies that are at the same time the biggest stumbling block 
for the overall functioning of the European union. 24
As we can see, in the beginning of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
1992, the European union did not have institutional capacities, nor did it 
have readiness and political will to actively engage in order to put the war to 
an end. According to Samuel Huntington, «The initial schemes of European 
construction erected on motives such as peace, progress, cultural self-esteem, 
solidarity, the commonality of ideas and aspirations were seriously shaken.» 25 
Europe was unfit to face the most serious crisis on its soil after the end of the 
Second World War.
Although the common foreign and security policy was institutionalized 
by the Maastricht Treaty, foreign policy cooperation between the European 
union countries began in the 1970s in the framework of European Political 
Cooperation as well as the regular consultations of foreign ministers, harmo-
nization of attitudes and agreement on common trends. However, two dec-
ades later, European diplomacy was extremely ineffective, 26 it lacked adequate 
instruments, and the courage to undertake any decisive activity – it was almost 
transport, energy and the area of freedom, security and justice. When it comes to a common 
foreign and security policy, the Eu is responsible for defining and implementing activities in 
these areas, including common defence policy (art. 2) without reducing the responsibilities and 
competences of each member state in the formulation and implementation of its own foreign 
policy, the national diplomatic service, relations with third countries and participation in inter-
national organizations (Declaration on Common Foreign and Security Policy). However, every 
Member State that wishes to pursue activities under the common foreign and security policy is 
obliged to inform the Council, the Eu High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, 
and the Commission (art. 331), Treaty on European union and the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European union with Protocol, Annexes, and Declarations, retrieved https://eur-lex.
europa.eu/legal-content/En/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=En, accessed 
30 July 2018) 
23 dannreuther, R., European Union Foreign and Security Policy: towards a neighborhood strategy, 
Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2004, pp. 66-133.
24 Ibid., p. 94.
25 huntinGton, S. P., Sukob civilizacija i preustroj svjetskog poretka, Zagreb, 1998, p. 160. 
26 Freedman, L., «Why the West Failed», Foreign Policy, no. 94, Winter 1994-95, pp. 18-62.
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completely absent at the crucial moment for the survival of one state and one 
nation.
initially, the un had a major role in resolving the crisis in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina. At the end of 1991, the un declared, at the peace conference in The 
Hague, arms embargo to former Yugoslavia. The embargo almost completely 
tied hands of the then Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which 
was fighting against the former Yugoslav People’s Army, the fourth largest mili-
tary force in Europe, and at the same time enabled the full military superiority of 
the Serb forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had Yugoslav People’s Army 
fighting on its side. Public opinion and decision-makers from Western countries 
have learned the horrors of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina thanks to the 
courage of several Western reporters, their discovery of concentration camps in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and sending to the world the images of persecution, 
torture and the horrors that the inmates went through. in mid-August 1992, the 
united nations decided to send 23,000 of its soldiers (unPRoFoR) whose 
primary task was the protection of humanitarian convoys. 27
unfortunately, unPRoFoR, this rather helpless un mission, was unable 
to fulfill its mission and protect humanitarian convoys. After an italian plane, 
which transported humanitarian aid to the citizens of the besieged Sarajevo, was 
crashed and after courageous journalists again unravelled how Bosnian Serbs 
were throwing cluster bombs onto civilians in unprotected settlements, the un 
Security Council, with the support of the united States, issued a resolution 
imposing no fly zone over Bosnia and Herzegovina, 28 leaving out unfortunately 
provisions that would ensure the implementation of the resolution. instead, the 
resolution stated that if the Serbs continue to fly military planes, that the Se-
curity Council would «urgently consider further measures necessary to ensure 
no fly zone». 29 As might have been expected, the resolution was systematically 
violated by the Bosnian Serbs, as hundreds of unauthorized helicopter, combat 
and transport aircraft flights were recorded. This was also the reason for the 
un Security Council to issue a new resolution authorizing nATo airplanes to 
bring down any plane that violates the no fly zone above Bosnia and Herzegovi-
27 voBLenko, v.v., «Multinational Peacekeeping operations in the Balkans: Past and Present», 
Military Thought, p. 25; and Fouskas, v., «The European Dream, Debates», Journal of Southern 
Europe and the Balkans, Carfax Publishing, Taylor and Francis Group, London, 2003, p. 40.
28 LeWis, P., «un Bans Flights in Bosnia but is Silent on Enforcement», New York Times, 10 oc-
tober 1992, pp. 47-201.
29 Ibid., pp. 59-81. 
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na. This was the first nATo mission in a country non-member of the Alliance, 
and it involved uS, British, French and Dutch air force. 30
As the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina continued, the helplessness and 
impotence of the un peacekeeping force of unPRoFoR became more ap-
parent. The most serious blow to unPRoFoR’s credibility was their con-
tinued humiliation and hostage taking by the Serb forces. 31 in early 1995, 
European countries which contributed military staff to unPRoFoR, began 
to warn that they would withdraw their troops. 32 After the fall of Srebrenica 
in July 1995, 33 their withdrawal became inevitable, and the shame was com-
plete. 34 The un peacekeeping force was suspended, and in August 1995, 
Holbrooke’s shuttle diplomacy 35 began, after nATo forces had launched air 
strikes on Bosnian Serb military positions.
30 Leurdijk, D. A., «Before and after Dayton: the un and nATo in the former Yugoslavia», The 
World Quarterly, Taylor and Francis Group, London, 1997, pp. 208-299.
31 There were numerous cases of capturing and hostage taking of unPRoFoR soldiers, especial-
ly before the end of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, primarily with the aim of preventing 
nATo air strikes against the positions of the Army of Republika Srpska. i will mention only a 
few examples. in April 1994, the Republika Srpska Army broke a cease-fire agreement, and un-
PRoFoR urged nATo to intervene. in retaliation, Serbian troops captured 400 soldiers and 
officers of unPRoFoR. in late May 1995, members of the Republika Srpska Army disarmed 
and captured forty blue helmets in the Sarajevo municipality of ilidza, only to release them 
twenty days later. That same year, in Pale near Sarajevo, several blue helmets were captured and 
bound to electric power pole. in addition, unPRoFoR vehicles were often exposed to gunfire 
and artillery fire by members Army of Republika Srpska.
32 LeWis, p. 17.
33 on July 11, 1995, the Republika Srpska Army together with members of the paramilitary unit 
Scorpions, under the control of the Serbian interior Ministry, committed genocide, the biggest 
crime since the Second World War. in the genocide in Srebrenica, 8372 Bosniak men and boys 
aged 12 to 77 were killed. More than twenty years after the genocide had been committed, the 
remains of all victims have not yet been found in numerous mass graves in Bosnia and Herzego-
vina. it is important to note that at that time Srebrenica was a un protected zone and that the 
mentioned units had conquered Srebrenica in the presence of the unPRoFoR Dutch units. 
34 At the end of 1994, nATo decided to intervene to help withdrawal of blue helmets. The uS 
administration, led by President Bill Clinton, confirmed this commitment, so that nATo mil-
itary strategic planners began to work on the operational Plan 40104. Based on this plan, the 
evacuation force was composed of 60,000 people, of which the Americans accounted for a third 
– 20,000 soldiers. For more information see: Bass, W., The Triage of Dayton, Foreign Affairs, 
Council on Foreign Relations, new York, September/october 1998. 
35 The Dayton Agreement was the result of the so-called shuttle diplomacy, or the initial strong 
diplomatic efforts of the American diplomat, professor, and publicist, Richard Holbrooke and 
his team. Shuttle diplomacy, perhaps the most dynamic form of diplomacy, involves negotiating 
and reconciling the demands of the warring parties in an extremely dynamic environment and 
frequent travel, so the team often had breakfast in one country, lunch in the other, and dinner in 
the third country.
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Why did the international community wait four long years to stop the 
war in Bosnia and Herzegovina? The European union did not have a sin-
gle position, nor could it have achieved a political consensus on almost any 
issue, including the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. in the period 1992-
1995, numerous, unsuccessful European initiatives had continued, which 
unfortunately favoured a division of the state along ethnic lines: Lord Car-
rington’s and Lord owen’s initiative, 36 the Kutiljero 1992 peace proposals, 
vance-owen’s 1993, and owen-Stoltenberg’s 1994, peace plans. 37 «Regard-
less of some of the joint European peace initiatives, it was not possible, at 
that time, to gather two Eu members who shared similar positions, let alone 
to draft a common foreign policy towards the crisis region. in spite of the 
lack of political will, the European union and its member states did not 
have the strength to resolve the conflict in BiH.» 38 «integration in the field 
of foreign policy and defence has long been prevented by the deep division 
that existed between the Atlantists, first of all Britain and the netherlands, 
countries which insisted on the key role of nATo, Euro-centrists, including 
France and Belgium, which advocated the creation of autonomous Europe-
an armed forces and neutral states, Sweden, Finland, Austria and ireland, 
which were not ready for any of the options [the tendency of preserving 
national sovereignty].» 39
on the other hand, the Americans saw the war in Bosnia and Herzego-
vina as the European problem and considered that Bosnia and Herzegovina 
was an opportunity for the European union to show initiative and unity with-
in its common foreign and security policy, although they were unaware that 
their expectations were unrealistic and premature. «For the first time since 
the World War ii, Washington has completely left the question of the security 
of the Balkan region to the Europeans.» 40
After several years of bloodshed, persecution, murder, rape, ethnic 
cleansing followed by inadequate European initiatives and even more inad-
36 oWen, D., Balkan Odyssey, new York: Book Harcourt Brace & Company, cop. 1995, pp. 308-
466.
37 For more information about BiH peace plans of the international community see: Kasim, Begić, 
Bosna i Hercegovina od Vanceove misije do Daytonskog sporazuma (1991-1996), Bosanska knjiga. 
38 riGBy, A., Justice and Reconciliation After the Violence, Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner, 2001, pp. 15-
30.
39 ŠeGvić, S., Oružane snage EU u sigurnosnim okolnostima postmoderne ere, Split: Zbornik radova 
Pravnog fakulteta u Splitu, god. 47, 3/2010., pp. 621-645. 
40 hoLBrooke, R., Završiti rat, Šahinpašić, Sarajevo, 1998, p. 27. 
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equate un peacekeeping forces, there have been changes in uS politics, 41 
but also in the politics of the united Kingdom. With the coming of Prime 
Minister Tony Blair and Foreign Minister Robin Cook, the so-called «moral 
foreign policy» 42 was formulated, which contributed to a stronger and more 
determined engagement of the international community in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina.
Despite years of international efforts, the brutal four-year war in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina ended after a strong diplomatic engagement of the unit-
ed States and the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement. Although the uS 
intervention was partly motivated by national interests, 43 we must not forget 
that the intervention of the united States in BiH was the largest international 
humanitarian intervention ever undertaken with the goal of stopping ethnic 
cleansing in Bosnia and Herzegovina and a few years later in Kosovo. 44 We 
will not make a mistake if we say that the American intervention in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is the most important foreign policy achievement of President 
Bill Clinton. Europe was embarrassed by the Dayton Agreement, and on the 
insistence of France, the peace agreement was signed in Paris.
Although the united States played a key role in ending the brutal war, 
Germany, France, the united Kingdom and the European union, in addition 
to the united States, are the guarantors of the Agreement and have a major 
role in its implementation.
41 Although in his election campaign, President Bill Clinton severely criticized George W. Bush’s 
policies toward the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, accusing him of being immoral because he 
turned his back on the most serious human rights violation in Europe after World War ii, after 
taking over the office, Clinton continued the policy of his predecessor. Carrying the burden of 
the failure of uS soldiers in Somalia and the crisis in Haiti, accompanied by the opposition of 
most of his political advisers and the uS public to the intervention, President Bill Clinton did 
not dare to act. The change in American politics occurred only after the Republicans won the 
1994 elections for the American Congress. For more information see: Burk, J., «Public Sup-
port for peace keeping in Lebanon and Somalia: Assessing the Casualties Hypothesis,» Political 
Science Quarterly, 1999, pp. 53-78, and Feaver, P.D.; GeLpi, C., Choosing Your Battles: American 
Civil.Military Relations and the Use ofForce, Princeton, Princeton university Press, 2004. 
42 petritsch, W., Bosna i Hercegovina od Daytona do Evrope, Svjetlost, Sarajevo, 2002.
43 The uS administration considered that inaction could cast a shadow on the American position 
of the leader of the Western world, and that Bosnian fire could spread first on Europe, and then 
on the uSA, posing a serious threat to its national security. We also must not forget financial, 
economic, and energy interests. For more information, see: Worth, R., «Clinton’s Warriors 
The interventionists», World Policy Yournal, Spring 1998.
44 Foreign Policy, Clinton’s Foreign Policy, Carnegie Endowment for international Peace, Wash-
ington, november-December 2000 and Bardos, G. n., Notes from the Balkans, The national 
interest, The nixon Center, Washington, Jul/Aug 2007, p. 112. 
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2. dayton peace aGreement and the upGradinG oF the eu’s 
common ForeiGn and security poLicy
The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina ended with the General Framework 
Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina [the Dayton Agreement], 
which provided the basis and created the military and political conditions nec-
essary to end violence and build lasting peace, including establishment of po-
litical institutions and the economic recovery of the country. 45 The Agreement 
contains 11 articles, 11 annexes, 102 maps, numerous appendices, declarations 
and letters. The immediate objective of the Agreement was to stop bloodshed 
and ethnic cleansing, and then establishing a stable multiethnic state, along 
with the reconciliation of the warring parties. 46
The Dayton Peace Agreement was the result of the failure of European 
politics to treat the war in BiH as a strategic threat to collective security in 
Europe. initially, Europe and America treated the war in Bosnia as a localized 
humanitarian crisis, rather than a strategic challenge to the future expansion 
of nATo and the European union. 47 The united States has Europeanized 
the Bosnian problem. At the same time, European countries had neither insti-
tutional capacities, nor the political will, and also lacked coordination mech-
anisms to decisively respond to, or to stop the killings, persecution, ethnic 
cleansing, rape and genocide in BiH. Such a policy had far-reaching nega-
tive consequences – more than 100,000 people killed, over a million displaced 
persons and refugees, between 35,000 and 50,000 raped Bosniak women and 
girls. 48 Bosnia has become a symbol of the failure of the common foreign and 
security policy of the European union.
Richard Holbrooke, the creator of the Dayton Agreement, recalls that 
although the Eu had its Special Representative, Carl Bildt, one of the three 
Co-Chairmen in the Dayton negotiations, Germany, Great Britain and France 
sent their representatives. Each of these three countries made it clear that 
45 Baas, W., The Triage of Dayton, new York, Foreign Affairs, Council on Foreign Relations, Sep-
tember/october 1998, pp. 32-211; and BiLdt, C., Peace Journey, The Struggle for Peace in Bosnia, 
London, Weidenfeld and nicholson, 1999.
46 riGBy, A., Justice and Reconciliation After the Violence, Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner, 2001, pp. 15-
30. 
47 in the absence of a consensus on issues of crucial importance for Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 
same, indecisive, somewhat timid policy of the Eu, unfortunately, continued in post-war years.
48 WoodWard, S. L., Balkan tragedy: chaos and dissolution after the cold war, Washington, The 
Brookings institution, 1995, pp. 79-138.
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Karl Bildt did not speak on their behalf. 49 According to Richard Holbrooke, 
the Dayton Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina symbolizes the strong 
political will, global economic and security strength, determination and com-
mitment of the united States on one hand, and the political and institutional 
weakness and absence of unity of the European union and its member states 
in the early 1990s, on the other. The agreement showed that the uSA was still 
an inevitable security factor in Europe. 50
«unless the united States is prepared to put its political and military 
muscle behind the quest for solutions to European instability, nothing really 
gets done.» 51
Without diminishing significance of the Dayton Agreement in the con-
text of ending the war, now i will look at the structural weaknesses and defi-
ciencies of the Agreement, i.e. the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
so that the reader gets clearer picture about the existential challenges and 
problems Bosnia and Herzegovina is facing today, more than twenty years 
after it has been signed, on its path to building and strengthening a modern 
democratic society that seeks to become part of the European family. The 
Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina is an integral part of the Dayton 
Agreement as its Annex iv:
– The BiH Constitution gave considerable powers to its entities, Feder-
ation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska, at the expense 
of the state, so that its entities enjoy many prerogatives of the state;
– The Dayton Agreement authorized both BiH entities to establish and 
develop special relations with neighbouring countries – Serbia, Mon-
tenegro and Croatia – and made it possible for the Bosnian citizens to 
have the citizenship of those countries; 52
– The Dayton Constitution introduced the possibility of blocking the 
government, as well as national inequality and numerous forms of dis-
crimination;
49 hoLBrooke, R., Završiti rat, Šahinpašić, Sarajevo, 1998, p. 2.
50 hoLBrooke, R., Put u Dayton, p. 373. 
51 At that time-u.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Richard 
C. Holbrooke, cited in drozdiak, W., «Europe’s Dallying Amid Crises Scares its Critics», 
International Herald Tribune, February 8, 1996, p. 90.
52 Bose, S., The Bosnian State a Decade after Dayton, international Peacekeeping, Taylor & Francis 
Ltd, new York, Autumn 2005, pp. 322-335. 
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– The Constitution is undemocratic and, in certain provisions, it is even 
in complete contradiction with the European Convention on Human 
Rights and Freedoms;
– Bosnia and Herzegovina is practically a country with apartheid;
– Some state functions can only be performed by members of the con-
stituent peoples – Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats – which is a direct dis-
crimination against all non-Bosniac, non-Croats, and non-Serbs, in-
cluding Jews, Roma, and members of all national minorities in BiH;
– it enables abuse of vital national interest and veto;
– it puts too much emphasis on ethnic-national, at the expense of the 
civil principle;
– Dayton broke BiH’s economic space and made too expensive, dysfunc-
tional and over-decentralized state administration; 53
– Bosnia and Herzegovina has the most complex state structure in the 
world, which is one of the most expensive ones in the world. BiH, a 
small state with about 3.5 million inhabitants has two entities, Brcko 
District under international supervision, ten cantons, fourteen con-
stitutions, as many governments and parliaments, an incredible 180 
ministers and ministries with a corresponding vast administration; 54
– 60% of gross domestic product goes on public expenditure, while 30% 
of GDP goes on public administration salaries;
– While in Western Europe, one official is employed to every 2000 in-
habitants, this number is four times higher in BiH, with one civil serv-
ant coming to 500 inhabitants; 55
– Bosnia and Herzegovina is too expensive, inefficient, dysfunctional 
and above all complicated state at all levels of government.
The Dayton Agreement created the country practically impossible to 
govern. 56 in this regard, it is necessary to establish a functional, rational and 
efficient state that will protect the rights of all its citizens, in order for the 
country to move along the path of economic and political development, which 
is a prerequisite for Bosnia and Herzegovina’s entry into the European un-
53 duraković, n., Domaća zadaća koju pišu stranci – Amandmani katastrofa za budućnost Bosne i 
Hercegovine, oslobođenje, 06 January 2007, pp. 3-8.
54 Ibid., pp. 10-12.
55 Ibid., p. 14.
56 daadLer, ivo H.; Froman, M.B.G., Dayton’s Incomplete Peace, Foreign Affairs, Council on For-
eign Relations, Washington, november/December 1999, pp. 218-307.
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ion and the nATo alliance. Former uS under-Secretary for Political Affairs 
emphasized the need to reform the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
more than a decade ago, «Dayton established a state with internal divisions 
– the ‘Berlin Wall’ separating one community from the other, as it was the 
only way to stop the war and build insecure and fragile peace. Ten years lat-
er, these interior walls have to be demolished. The peoples of this country 
– Croats, Serbs and Muslims – must be allowed to integrate, as other nations 
in other multiethnic states do on the entire planet – such as india, the united 
Kingdom, and the united States. Bosnia must form new state institutions that 
will pave the way for a new future of the country.» 57
Dayton Agreement’s creator himself, Richard Holbrooke, albeit proud of 
the achievements of the united States in Bosnia and Herzegovina, urged the uS 
administration to re-engage in BiH, this time in building a functional state. 58 
Stable peace, social security and economic prosperity of BiH citizens are needed 
not only for Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also for this part of the world and for 
the whole of Europe, so that together, as one family we can scope with global 
challenges, in the field of security, economics and politics as decisive, inevitable, 
respectable and above all united factor of global stability, peace and well-being, 
because the power is in unity: «Bosnia is located in the heart of Europe. Peace 
in Bosnia will also help build a free and stable Europe.» 59
2.1. EU Treaties of Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon
Additional failure of the European common foreign and security policy 
occurred only a few years later, while the memories of the Bosnian fiasco were 
still alive, and in the same region just a little to the south – in Kosovo. 60 «once 
again, as earlier in the 1990s, Europeans appeared weak and incapable when 
responding to a security challenge in their own backyard-the Balkans.» 61
57 Burns, n. R., Bosnia Ten Years Later: Successes and Challenges, uS Peace institute address, Wash-
ington D.C, 21 november 2005. 
58 hoLBrooke, R., «Was Bosnia worth it?», Washington Post, 19 July 2005. 
59 cLinton, W. J., Letter to Congressional leaders on Bosnia, Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents, 1996, vol 32, issue 52, p. 2535.
60 mahncke, A.D.; reynoLds, A., European Foreign Policy: From Rhetoric to Reality?, P.i.E.-Peter 
Lang, Brussels, 2004, pp. 48-98.
61 cornish, P.; edWards, G., Beyonf the EU/NATO Dichotomy: The Beginninings of the European 
Strategic Culture, 2001, vol. 77, no. 3, Changing Pattern pf European Security and Defence, 
oxford university Press on behačf of the Royal institute of international Affairs, pp. 588.
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it was the painful experience of Kosovo that urged at that time fifteen 
Eu members to take radical steps towards consolidating a common foreign 
and security policy. Dissatisfaction, frustration and a sense of inferiority again 
due to American domination and supremacy in resolving the Kosovo crisis 
gathered Eu member states in Helsinki into a powerful coalition that man-
aged to achieve unprecedented consensus on institutional strengthening of 
its military capabilities in all its segments – combat, logistics, intelligence and 
communication.
«The Eu agreed to develop the capacity to deploy a force of 60,000 
troops by 2003... that would be able to carry out a range of tasks from non-
combat peacekeeping, to humanitarian, rescue and combat missions; the so-
called ‘Petersburg tasks’, which was recently incorporated into the Amster-
dam Treaty on European union (art. 17)» 62
«Following the escalation of the crisis in the Balkans, and temporarily 
discouraged by the Eu’s diplomatic failures, the Eu institutions reinforced 
the awareness that more common approach to the development of common 
security and defence was needed, and at the Amsterdam summit in 1997, the 
Treaty was concluded, which confirms the previous positions, and introdu-
ces new instruments for their realization.» 63
2.1.a. The Treaty of Amsterdam
The Amsterdam Treaty was signed on october 2, 1997, and entered 
into force on May 1, 1999. 64 one of the basic objectives of this agreement 
is to strengthen the European identity on the international scene through 
the implementation of a common foreign and security policy, including the 
progressive design of a common defence policy in the process of promoting 
peace, security and progress in Europe and the world. 65 The objectives of 
62 Ibid., pp. 589-603.
63 ŠeGvić, S.; BěLohradský, F., Sigurnosno-obrambena politika EU, Zbornik radova Pravnog fakul-
teta u Splitu, god. 45, 2/2008., p. 367. 
64 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty of European union, the Treaties establishing the 
European Communities and certain related acts (1997), Luxembourg: office for official Publi-
cations of the European Communities, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/trea-
ty/pdf/amst-en.pdf. 
65 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty of European union, the Treaties establishing the 
European Communities and certain related acts (1997), Luxembourg: office for official Publi-
cations of the European Communities, p. 8, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/
treaty/pdf/amst-en.pdf..
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the common foreign and security policy remained unchanged in relation to 
the Maastricht Treaty. Article J.7 of the Amsterdam Treaty also defines the 
tasks of the Western European union, which include: rescue, humanitarian, 
peacekeeping and combat tasks in crisis situations. All Eu Member States 
have a full right to participate in planning and making decisions regarding these 
activities. 66
The novelty introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty in relation to Maas-
tricht Treaty is the role of the Secretary-General of the Council, who will 
serve as the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Poli-
cy, and at the same time assist the Presidency as the primary representative of 
the union in all matters in the area of foreign and security policy, primarily in 
drafting, preparing and implementing political decisions. 67
2.1.b. The Treaty of nice
The Treaty of nice was signed on February 26, 2001, and entered into 
force on February 1, 2003. it established a Committee on Political and Secu-
rity issues with the task of monitoring international situation in the areas of 
common foreign and security policy, defining policies and monitoring the im-
plementation of agreed policies, as well as implementing the policy of control 
and strategic direction of operations. 68 it is only in the Declaration on Euro-
pean Security and Defence Policy, which forms an integral part of the Treaty 
of nice, that the European union’s commitment and goal to make this policy 
operational as soon as possible were specified.
66 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty of European union, the Treaties establishing the 
European Communities and certain related acts (1997), Luxembourg: office for official Publi-
cations of the European Communities, p. 13, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/
treaty/pdf/amst-en.pdf.
67 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty of European union, the Treaties establishing the 
European Communities and certain related acts (1997), Luxembourg: office for official Pub-
lications of the European Communities, Article J. 8, p. 14, available at http://www.europarl.
europa.eu/topics/treaty/pdf/amst-en.pdf..
68 Treaty of nice Amending the Treaty on European union, the Treaties establishing European 
Cummunities and certain related acts (2001/c 80/01), Declaration on the European security and 
defence policy, official Journal of the European union, p. 8, available at https://eur-lex.europa.
eu/legal-content/En/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12001C/TXT&from=En. 
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2.1.c. The Treaty of Lisbon
Signed on 13 november 2007, and came into force on 01 november 2009. 
The Treaty of Lisbon established the Eu Foreign Affairs Council chaired by 
the High Representative. The foreign and security policy has been institutional-
ized; the powers of the High Representative have been increased to include the 
tasks such as to ensure the consistency of the union’s external activities, to im-
prove external relations and to co-ordinate other aspects of the union’s external 
activities. Development of the union’s external action plans on the basis of the 
strategic guidelines of the European Council was defined as the main task of the 
Foreign Affairs Council. 69 An external service has been established.
«The novelty in the Lisbon Treaty [the Treaty on European union] is the 
establishment of the so-called permanent structured co-operation: this is a 
higher level of integration among member states that meet several criteria of 
military capabilities, in performing the most demanding missions.» 70
3. internationaL community and the impLementation oF the 
dayton peace aGreement
The responsibility of the international community to implement the 
Dayton Peace Agreement is one of the most important determinants of the 
Agreement. This responsibility is reflected in the presence of international 
military forces, provision of economic assistance and management of the pro-
cess of reconstruction and reintegration of the country through the office of 
the High Representative. 71 in Dayton, a decision was made that the military 
and civil provisions of the agreement shall be implemented separately. The 
High Representative is in charge of implementing the civilian provisions of 
the Agreement, while military annex 1A foresees that the military provisions 
69 Treaty of Lisbon, amending the Treaty on European union and the Treaty establish-
ing the European Community (2207/c 306/01), officialn Journal of the European union, 
p. 21, available at http://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/688a7a98-3110-4ffe-a6b3-
8972d8445325.0007.01/DoC_19. 
70 Rudolf, D, ml: Zajednička sigurnosna i obrambena politika europske unije..., Split, Zbornik radova 
Pravnog fakulteta u Splitu, god. 51, 3/2014., p. 557. 
71 pejanović, M., Međunarodna zajednica i država Bosna i Hercegovina, and Sumantra, Bose, S., 
The Bosnian State a Decade after Dayton, international Peacekeeping, Taylor & Francis Ltd, new 
York, Autumn 2005, pp. 61-119. 
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of the agreement are implemented and overseen by international troops. 72 
numerous civilian agencies and international organizations, such as the oS-
CE, 73 the unHCR, the World Bank and the iMF, have been involved in the 
implementation of the Dayton Agreement.
The negotiation process that resulted in the signing of the Dayton Agree-
ment was led by the united States, while the implementation of its civilian 
provisions was left to the Europeans. namely, it was agreed in Dayton that 
the High Representative would always be a European, one deputy German, 
and the other American. 74 Functions of the High Representative – the high-
est international civilian authority in BiH – were initially extremely limited. 75 
However, two years after the signing of the Dayton Agreement, the High 
Representative was given increased, the so-called «Bonn Powers», 76 which 
enabled the High Representative to replace officials who obstruct the imple-
mentation of the Agreement, and imposed the adoption of laws, when local 
authorities are not willing to do so. 77
All the key laws regulating establishing or functioning of the central state 
institutions such as the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Prosecutor’s office 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council, Central 
Bank, intelligence and Security Agency, indirect Taxation Administration have 
been «imposed» by the High Representative before being adopted in a regular 
parliamentary procedure in the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH. We should not 
72 capLan, R., Assessing the Dayton Accord: The Structural Weaknesses of the General Framework 
Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Diplomacy & Statecraft, Published by Frank 
Cass, London, July 2000, pp. 213-232 
73 taLBott, S., The OSCE in Bosnia, u.S. Department of State Dispatch, 11 December 1995, 
vol. 6, issue pp. 50-52, Speech. 
74 chandLer, D., From Dayton to Europe, international Peacekeeping, Taylor & Francis Ltd, new 
York, Autumn 2005, pp. 336-349.
75 capLan, R., International Authority and State Building: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Global 
Governance, Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2004, pp. 53-65.
76 At the meeting of the Peace implementation Council, the body tasked with overseeing the 
implementation of the Dayton Agreement, composed of all states and organizations involved 
in the implementation of the Agreement, held in Bonn in 1997, it was decided to give the 
High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina the powers that would facilitate the process 
of making binding decisions, and enable removal of all political representatives who obstruct 
the implementation of the Dayton Agreement. in the beginning, the High Representative used 
these powers extensivelly, however, in recent years, unfortunately, he completely refrains from 
using them, directly contributing to the maintenance of the painful political status quo.
77 capLan, R., International Authority and State Building: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Global 
Governance, Lynne Reinner Publishers 2004, pp. 53-65. 
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neglect the importance of the international community when it comes to the 
return of refugees and displaced persons, protection of human rights, and eco-
nomic reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 78 These are just some of the 
examples of the international community’s efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
which was crucial for the building of democracy, democratic society and dem-
ocratic institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as for reform processes 
that involve the adoption and application of international standards. 79
in the post-war period, Bosnia and Herzegovina was largely built, the 
infrastructure was restored and the overall situation normalized. «Peace has 
been achieved and there is a clear sense of increased security throughout the 
country.» 80 in 2000, the European Stability initiative announced that al-
though uneven, efforts in reconstruction were «extremely successful». 81 The 
post-conflict reconstruction plan in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been a sig-
nificant success. Since the end of 1995, the international community has do-
nated around $ 9 billion in reconstruction assistance, 82 «about $ 1,200 per 
person has been provided for the reconstruction of the country or about nine 
times more than within the Marshall Plan.» 83 The biggest donors were the 
European union, the World Bank and the uS Government. Paradoxically, 
the country has not managed to achieve economic recovery.
3.1. Implementation of the military provisions of the Agreement
on December 20, 1995, the then un Secretary General Boutros Ghali 
announced the end of the existence of unPRoFoR and announced the for-
mation of multinational forces (iFoR). These forces, which replaced 20,000 
78 ducasse-roGier, M., «Recovering from Dayton: From ‘peace-building’ to ‘state-building’ in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina», Helsinki Monitor, 2004, pp. 91-153.
79 curtiss, R.H., Bosnia Ten Years Later, Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, Washington, 
Sep/oct 2005, pp. 44-45, Report. 
80 BiLdt, C., «A Second Chance in the Balkans», Foreign Affairs, 80 January/February 2001, 
pp. 148-158; ivo H. Daalder and Michael B.G. Froman, Dayton’s Incomplete Peace, Foreign 
Affairs Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, november/December 1999, pp. 106-113. 
81 Reshaping international Priorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, mart 2001, European Stability 
initiative http://www.esiweb.org, 19 April 2002. 
82 Bosnia’s Precarious Economy: Still not open for Business, international Crisis Group, Balkans 
Report, no. 115, 07 August 2001. 
83 BeLLoni, R., «Civil Society and Peace Building in Bosnia and Herzegovina», Journal of Peace 
Research, international Peace Research institute, oslo, March 2001, pp. 163-180. 
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unPRoFoR forces, were in charge of the implementation of the military 
provisions of the Dayton Agreement and numbered 60,000 troops comprised 
of nATo member states and third countries. 84 The one-year iFoR mission 
began in December 1995. This was entirely a nATo mission, elaborated in 
Brussels outisde the un scope. 85 What is especially important when it comes 
to iFoR mission is that the officers of non-nATo countries were incorpo-
rated in the command structure of the iFoR force under the command of the 
nATo Council, although the Americans held key commanding positions. 86
in addition, the involvement of the nATo forces in Bosnia and Herze-
govina within the framework of the iFoR mission was in many ways unique. 87 
namely, it was the first operation outside the nATo area with the partners 
of the member states of the Partnership for Peace 88 and non-nATo member 
84 petritsch, W., Bosna i Hercegovina od Daytona do Evrope, Svjetlost, Sarajevo, 2002, p. 67.
85 christopher, W., «nATo: Reaching out to new partners and new challenges», u.S. Depart-
ment of State Dispatch; 11 December 1995, vol. 6, issue 50-52, p. 902, Speech.
86 Leurdijk, D.A., «Before and after Dayton: the un and nATo in the former Yugoslavia», The 
World Quarterly, Taylor and Francis Group, London, 1997, pp. 457-470.
87 After erecting the iron curtain and dividing the world into the Eastern and Western blocs in 
1949, the Western countries formed the nATo alliance as a collective defense system and a 
clear response to the security threats posed by the Soviet union and the East Bolsheviks. its 
primary mission, defined in Article 51 of the un Charter and Article 5 of the Washington 
Treaty, was the protection and preservation of the freedom and security of its member states, 
the prevention of the outbreak of war and the prevention of the spread of communism. With 
the collapse of the Soviet union and the Warsaw Pact and the establishment of the new secu-
rity architecture, someone would have thought that the reason for the existence of the nATo 
alliance disappeared. By the end of the Cold War, the concept of security has been drastically 
changed so that, in addition to defending, it also includes an economic and political com-
ponent. Keeping up with the modern security development, nATo planners have decided 
that its next mission would be protection of human rights and the advancement of democra-
cy. in the spring of 1999, nATo deeply deviated from its original mission in Kosovo for the 
first time in an offensive, rather than defensive style. September 11 further modified nATo 
mission formally introducing the concept of self-defense. For more information see: GaBor, 
F.A., «Reflections on nATo’s new Mission: Conflict Prevention in the Struggles for Ethnic 
Self-Determinaion», Review of Central and East European Law 2004, pp. 247-256, 2004, Konin-
klijke Brill n.v., Printed in the netherlands, and mcLauGhLin, J. C., US-Russian cooperation 
in IFOR: Partners for peace, Military Review, Fort Belvoir vA, juli/avgust 1997, pp. 42-88. 
88 in implementing military provisions of the Dayton Agreement, nATo under the control and dom-
ination of the united States, gathered a coalition of countries that was truly unprecedented. in addi-
tion to numerous countries from Europe and north America, Russian troops had significant role in 
the iFoR forces, and later on in SFoR. For the first time since the end of the Cold War two major 
cold-war enemies – the united States and Russia – took part in the same joint task on a partnership 
basis under the joint command. This was a unique and, at the same time, a successful mission, one 
positive experience in a very difficult post-war circumstances. For more information see: voBLen-
ko, v.v., Multinational Peacekeeping Operations in the Balkans: Past and Present, Military Thought.
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states, under a joint command and in accordance with nATo rules. 89 in addi-
tion to military tasks, the mandate of iFoR included establishing an environ-
ment for the uninterrupted implementation of the civilian provisions of the 
agreement, providing support to the international Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia, as well as ensuring freedom of movement.
The Stabilization Force – SFoR were formed by the Resolution 1088 of 
the un Security Council after the successful completion of the iFoR mission, 
on 12 December 1996. in addition to continuing the iFoR mission, SFoR’s 
tasks were to ensure lasting peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to provide 
support to civilian agencies working on the implementation of the Agree-
ment. 90 36,000 SFoR troops 91 from 37 countries members and non-members 
of nATo from all over the world were deployed in three multinational di-
visions: the Multinational Division northeast, mainly composed of French 
forces and under the command of the French General, the Multinational Di-
vision Southwest largely filled by forces from Great Britain and led by the 
British General and the Multinational Division north, mainly comprised of 
uS soldiers led by the uS General. 92
in accordance with un Security Council Resolution 1575 of 22 no-
vember 2004, nATo has completed operations under the Stabilization Force 
(SFoR). 93 At the istanbul Summit, nATo members «agreed to conclude the 
Alliance’s successful SFoR operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and wel-
comed the readiness of the European union to deploy a new and distinct 
un-mandated Chapter vii mission in the country, based on Berlin-plus ar-
rangements agreed between our two organizations.» 94 However, nATo did 
89 aLBriGth, M., A New NATO for a new century, Dispatch, 10(3), 1999, p. 7. 
90 ciraFici, J.L., SFOR in Bosnia in 1997: A watershed year, uS Army War College, Carlisle, 1999, 
pp. 208-252.
91 As the situation on the ground stabilized, SFoR’s structure changed and the number of troops 
decreased. With an initial 60,000 members of the iFoR force, over 36,000 initial SFoR troops, 
in December 2003, this force numbered 7,000 soldiers. Multinational brigades have also been 
transformed into multinational forces. For more information see: Generalmajor virgil Packett, 
James F. Smith, Edwin P. Woods and Edward C. Guilford, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Coalition 
Doctrine and LoT Houses, Military Review, Fort Belvoir vA, March-April 2005. 
92 cLinton, W.L., Letter to Congressional leaders on Bosnia, Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents, 1996, vol 32, issue 52, p. 535.
93 kriendLer, J., NATO Crisis Management Cooperation with PfP Partners and Other International 
Organizations, Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies 
institutes, vol. 3, no. 4, December 2004, p. 66.
94 «istanbul Summit Communiqué.» Quoted in John Kriendler, NATO Crisis Management Cooper-
ation with PfP Partners and Other International Organizations, Partnership for Peace Consortium 
of Defence Academies and Security Studies institutes, vol. 3, no. 4, December 2004, p. 67. 
EU Common ForEign and SECUrity PoliCy and BoSnia and HErzEgovina
AnuARio ESPAñoL DE DERECHo inTERnACionAL / voL. 35 / 2019 639
not end its engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 95 namely, nATo formed 
the Staff in Sarajevo, which initially numbered 7,000 96 soldiers and which, 
together with the EuFoR, became the legal successor to SFoR. 97 in addition 
to the tasks undertaken so far by the troops in charge of the implementation 
of the military provisions of the Dayton Agreement, the nATo Staff and 
EuFoR missions have been expanded to include defence reform and anti-ter-
rorism activities. 98
Apart from this, the first civil emergency assistance operation in the 
framework of the European Security and Defence Policy was launched on 
January 1, 2003. An Eu Police Mission (EuPM) was formed, which replaced 
the un international Police Task Force in BiH (iPTF). The EuPM was the 
first civilian crisis control operation under the European Security and De-
fence Policy (ESDP). EuPM members came from 33 countries, at the time 27 
Eu Member States, as well as iceland, Canada, norway, Sweden, Turkey and 
ukraine. 99 The mission did not have executive powers, which confirmed the 
increased responsibility of BiH and the reduction of the role of the interna-
tional community. its main mission was establishing professional, sustainable 
and multi-ethnic police force that works in accordance with the best Europe-
an and international standards. in addition, EuPM has supported the process 
of reforming local police forces, developing and consolidating local police ca-
pacities and regional cooperation in the fight against organized crime. The 
mandate of EuPM ended on December 31, 2011. 100
During the implementation of the Dayton Agreement, which began 
after the signing of the Agreement and continues to date, the European 
union’s forces, together with the uS forces, with their military presence in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, were the guarantors of the peace and security in 
BiH. 101
95 kampschror, B., «nATo exits Bosnia», Christian Science Monitor, 03 December.2004, p. 83. 
96 nAToStaff today has only 65 staff members, 21 military and 44 civilian, https://jfcnaples.nato.
int/hqsarajevo/about-sarajevo-/nhqsa-team. 
97 rodman, P.W, «Yalta in the Balkans», National Review, 1995, p. 66. 
98 joseph, E.P., Back to the Balkans, Foreign Affairs, Council on Foreign Relations, new York, Jan/
Feb 2005, pp. 111-122 
99 EuPM documents, Direction for European integrations BiH, available at http://www.dei.gov.
ba/dokumenti/default.aspx?id=4593&langTag=bs-BA. 
100 EuPM Mission desription, European External Action Service, https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/
csdp/missions-and-operations/eupm-bih/index_en.htm. 
101 sjursen, H., On the Identity of NATO, international Affairs, 80(4), 2004, p. 702. 
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4. eu common security and deFence poLicy
The European Defence Community Treaty was the first step in estab-
lishing common European defence policy. The Treaty was signed on May 27, 
1952 in Paris, and the signatory countries were France, Germany, italy, Bel-
gium, the netherlands and Luxembourg. unfortunately, the Treaty remained 
only a dead letter since it did not pass the ratification in the French Parlia-
ment. 102 The next attempt at a stronger European unification in the field of 
defence and security took place two years later, with the establishment of the 
Western European union, which, although more successful than the former, 
still did not get full momentum. «Regardless of the initial upswing, nATo 
obscured all the intentions of the WEu founders by leaving them insignifi-
cant and routine jobs.» 103
unwilling to renounce their sovereignty in the field of security on the 
one hand, and yet insufficiently strong in military terms to resist the con-
stant attempts of one of the two superpowers, the Soviet union in spreading 
power and influence on the other, European countries have decided to rely 
on the united States and nATo as a credible and powerful military force, 
while continuing to lead individual policies in the field of defence and secu-
rity. A more serious approach to the establishment of a common European 
security and defence policy was taken after a series of tectonic geopolitical 
changes such as the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Soviet union, 
the end of the Cold War, and the emergence of the united States as the only 
truly global superpower, or the establishment of a unipolar world order. 104
After a series of unsuccessful attempts, common foreign and security pol-
icy was first defined by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. Article J.4 of the Treaty 
specifies that the Western European union, as an integral part of the devel-
opment of the union, will elaborate and implement decisions and activities of 
the union that have defence implications, while stating that the obligations of 
the member states within the nATo will be respected and that all activities 
102 mahncke, A.D.; reynoLds, A., European Foreign Policy: From Rhetoric to Reality?, P.i.E.-Peter 
Lang, Brussels, 2004, pp. 48-98.
103 ŠeGvić, S., Frano Belohradsky: Sigurnosno-obrambena politika Eu, Zbornik radova Pravnog 
fakulteta u Splitu, god. 45, 2/2008., p. 344.
104 voLker, P.; mair, S. (eds.), European Foreign and Security Policy: Challenges and Opportunities for 
the German EU Presidency, Research paper 2006/RP10, Berlin: German institute for interna-
tional and Security Affairs (SWP), october 2006, pp. 18-66.
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of the union in defence areas to be compatible with the common security and 
defence policy established within nATo. 105
in the Declaration of Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, italy, Luxembourg, 
Portugal and the united Kingdom on the role of the Western European un-
ion and its relationship with the European union and the north Atlantic Treaty, 
which is an integral part of the Maastricht Treaty, the member states of WEu rec-
ognized the need to truly strengthen the European security and defensive identity 
and greater European responsibility in defence matters. The WEu member states 
have agreed to strengthen its role as the defensive component of the European 
union, within the long-term perspective of the Eu’s common defence policy. in 
order to fulfil this goal, it will formulate a common European defence policy, and 
work on its implementation through the further development of its operational 
role. At the same time, WEu will develop cooperation and partnership with the 
north Atlantic Treaty organization in matters of common interest. 106
Although political cooperation between the European union countries 
began in 1970, which served as platform for discussion about security and for-
eign policy issues, the Maastricht Treaty institutionalized and marked a whole 
new chapter in the development of the common foreign and security policy. 
on the other hand, common European and security policy experienced its 
full momentum after the meeting of the European Council in Cologne held 
in June 1999. 107 The nice Treaty gave a formal status to the new Eu Military 
Committee, 108 and at the nATo summit held in Prague, a decision was made 
to establish a Rapid Response Force (RRF). 109
«The circumstances in which the Eu found itself at the end of the last 
century have led the Eu to precisely articulate its objectives, institutions 
105 Council of the European Communities (1992), Treaty on European union, Luxembourg: of-
fice for official Publications of the European Communities, p 128, available at https://europa.
eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/treaty_on_european_union_en.pdf. 
106 Council of the European Communities (1992), Treaty on European union, Luxembourg: of-
fice for official Publications of the European Communities, Declaration by Belgium, Germany, 
Spain, France, italy, Luxembourg, the netherlands, Portugal and the united Kingdom of Great 
Brltain and northern ireland, which are members of the Western European union and also 
members of the European union on the role of the Western European union and its relations 
with the European union and with the Atlantic Alliance, pp. 244-247.
107 croWe, B., A Common European Foreign Policy after Iraq, oxford university Press on behalf of 
the Royal institute of international Affairs, vol. 79, no.3, May 2003, p. 533. 
108 Ibid., p. 534.
109 Ibid., p. 540.
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and instruments of its foreign policy within the integration processes, with 
the need to create and develop the Eu’s military capacities to become one of 
the most important political issues of the union.» 110
Efforts to establish a joint European defence structure and its own secu-
rity identity lasted until the end of the last century. only in the beginning of 
the new millennium, more precisely in 2003, the Eu, for the first time since 
its decades-long existence, adopted its own strategic document in the field of 
security – the European Security Strategy.
Despite all the efforts that the European union has been investing in the 
field of defence and security, it is still «an economic giant, a political dwarf 
and a military worm.» 111 That in no way does not mean that the Eu does not 
have significant military force. Most of the Eu member states are at the same 
time nATo members armed with state-of-the-art military technology, and 
some are also nuclear powers. 112 Additionally, some of the member countries 
are also the world’s largest arms exporters. 113
To what extent is the European union likely to achieve greater cohesion 
in the future when it comes to common security policy? What does for Europe 
mean nATo membership under the uS command. For almost seven decades, 
110 ŠeGvić, S., oružane snage Eu u sigurnosnim okolnostima postmoderne ere, Split: Zbornik 
radova Pravnog fakulteta u Splitu, 47, 3/2010., p. 623.
111 The phrase «economic giant and political dwarf» was used about Germany and Japan after the 
Second World War. Quoted in Jorge Silva Paulo, The European Defense Sector and EU Integration, 
Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies institutes, vol. 8, 
no. 1, Winter 2008, p. 13. 
112 Gordon, n. i pardo, S., «What Can Pro-Democracy Activists in Arab Countries Expect from 
the European union? Lessons from the union’s Relations with israel», u: Bauer, P. (ur.). Arab 
Spring Challenges for Democracy and Security in the Mediterranean, London i new York, Rout-
ledge, 2015, pp. 100-119. LonGo, F., «The Relevance of Security Sector Reform in Humanitar-
ian intervention: The Case of the European union in the Mediterranean», u: Bauer, P. (ur.), 
Arab Spring Challenges for Democracy and Security in the Mediterranean, London i new York: 
Routledge, 2015, pp. 177-192.
113 France and the united Kingdom, along with China, the united States and Russia, belong to the 
group of the world’s largest arms exporters. These five countries are also permanent members 
of the Security Council, the body whose primary task is the preservation of world peace and se-
curity. The irony is that the countries with the greatest political influence in this global security 
body are at the same time most responsible for the arming of various warring parties around 
the world, as these five countries account for 70% of total global arms export. France and Great 
Britain are also nuclear powers, along with the united States, Russia, China, india, Pakistan, 
israel and north Korea. For more information, see: Peter Hough, Shahin Malik, Andrew Mo-
ran, and Bruce Pilbeam, International Security Studies, Theory and Practice, Routledge Taylor & 
Francis Group, London and new York, 2015, pp. 119-150.
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nATo has been in charge of security in Europe. nATo is too strong in or-
ganizational, institutional, and infrastructural sense; consequently it adapted 
quickly to the new geopolitical circumstances and, leaving its nATo area, 114 
has found a new mission, which includes peacekeeping operations, the fight 
against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 115 The 
security situation and the modern warfare have changed to a large extent in 
relation to the mid-1990s. Although it lost its original mission, nATo has not 
lost importance. 116 «nATo remains vital in ensuring European security and 
stability: not only because it is a tried and tested forum for discussion, includ-
ing with non-European allies, security and defence issues, but also because 
of the essential transatlantic military links embodied in nATo’s integrated 
military structure.» 117
However, nATo is not only important in the field of security and de-
fence. By acting as a powerful alliance with a modified mission, adapted 
to modern security challenges, nATo also provides significant support to 
European political processes. Perhaps the reason lies in the fact that the goal 
of the Eu’s common security and defence policy is not to secure the de-
fence of the Eu member states in the sense it has been provided by nATo, 
but to carry out the so-called «Petersbursg tasks» – humanitarian, rescue 
and peacekeeping tasks. 118 By enhancing its military capacity, the Europe-
an union can contribute to the establishment of a balanced transatlantic 
partnership that will be the backbone of global security. 119 Although some 
authors believe that nATo and the united States will continue to dominate 
Europe’s security landscape in the future «The uSA will still be dominant in 
the European security policy and in this respect one might even say the most 
114 Senator LuGar, R.G., «nATo: out of Area or out of Business. A Call for u.S. Leadership to 
Revive and Redefine the Alliance», Speech at the overseas Writer’s Club, Washington D.C., 24 
June 1993.
115 de dardeL, J.-J., Outreach Strategies in the wake of NATO and EU enlargement Refocusing on 
the Partnership fo Peace, Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defence Academies and Security 
Studies institutes, vol. 3, no. 2, June 2004, p. 101.
116 sjursen, H., On the Identity of NATO, international Affairs, 80(4), 2004, p. 34.
117 David Heathcoat-Amory explains in greater detail European security issues and the development of the 
WEU in his article in the July I994 issue of The World Today quoted in Douglas Hurd, Developing the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, international Affairs, oxford university Press on behalf of 
the Royal institute of international Affairs, vol. 70. no 3. July 1994, pp. 421-428. 
118 yost, D.S., Transatlantic Relations and Peace in Europe, oxford university Press on behalf of the 
Royal institute of international Affairs, vol. 78, no. 2, April 2002, p. 292.
119 Ibid., pp. 277-278. 
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prominent Eu member.» 120 After all, «in Bosnia and Kosovo, nATo has 
been a major actor through iFoR/SFoR and KFoR in providing security 
under a mandate of the un Security Council.» 121
Since the end of the Second World War, the American troops or nATo, 
being present on the European soil, have protected their European allies and 
prevented the spread of Soviet influence, both from the outside and from the 
inside. 122 Throughout the Cold War Europe enjoyed strong American protec-
tion to such an extent that we could say that it was under some kind of security 
protectorate. Even today, after the end of the Cold War, and the collapse of 
the Soviet union, and numerous security initiatives, nATo continues to be 
the backbone of Europe’s security. 123
nATo is still fundamental for stability and peace on this continent, 124 
and at the same time it is the most respectable and the most powerful security 
alliance in the world, with a number of countries still strongly endeavour to 
become its member, including Bosnia and Herzegovina.
4.1.  Bosnia and Herzegovina and membership in NATO and the European 
Union
With the adoption of the Law on Defence Reform which established 
unified army under the command and control of state institutions, and with 
the accession to the Partnership for Peace Program, 125 on December 14, 2006, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina made a historical step towards Euro-Atlantic inte-
gration. Ten years after the end of the brutal war, the once-warring parties, 
120 coBeLens, P., ‘De nAvo vergelijkenderwijs’, Militaire Spectator, April i999, pp. 198-205 (in 
Dutch). The translation of this passage is by Colonel Cobel quoted in yost, D.S., Transatlantic 
Relations and Peace in Europe, oxford university Press on behalf of the Royal institute of inter-
national Affairs, vol. 78, no. 2, April 2002, p. 296. 
121 de dardeL, J.-J., Outreach Strategies in the wake of NATO and EU enlargement Refocusing on 
the Partnership fo Peace, Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defence Academies and Security 
Studies institutes, vol. 3, no. 2, June 2004, p. 100. 
122 harvey, F.P., «Addicted to security», International Journal, 59(1), 2003-4, p. 16. 
123 Brzezinski, Z., AMERIČKI IZBOR: Globalna dominacija ili globalno vodstvo, Politička kultura, 
nakladno-istraživački zavod, Zagreb, 2004, CiD Podgorica, 2004. 
124 christopher, W., «nATo: Reaching out to new partners and new challenges», u.S. Depart-
ment of State Dispatch; 11.12.1995, vol. 6, issue 50-52, p. 902, Speech. 
125 The Partnership for Peace program is a nATo initiative launched in 1994 to extend defense 
cooperation to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and represents the first level of 
institutional dialogue with the Alliance, but does not guarantee admission. 
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with strong support of the united States, formed a joint military force com-
patible with nATo. Taking these and other steps, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
has demonstrated its strong commitment to nATo membership. 126
Whatever irresponsible BiH political leadership might me, it is neverthe-
less aware that the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina is full integration into 
European and Euro-Atlantic institutions – European union and nATo. This 
is, at the same time, the main foreign-policy priority of the state. 127 Future 
nATo membership is essential for security and overall prosperity of BiH cit-
izens – political, economic and social. There are numerous economic advan-
tages that will come with a normal trade relationship with the united States 
and Europe, as well as the political and security benefits that come with mem-
bership in nATo and the European union, which BiH needs and must take 
advantage of. Bosnia and Herzegovina can do this only if it becomes a member 
of the European union and the nATo. 128 Bosnia and Herzegovina should at 
any cost join the nATo for the following reasons:
– Any possibility of war and international conflict in BiH would be 
avoided;
– Danger of any kind of external intervention on Bosnia and Herzegovi-
na would be eliminated;
– The poor BiH economy would considerably be relieved of the expend-
iture for military and defence;
– it would significantly improve political and legal security of BiH, 
which would pave the way for foreign and domestic investments, i.e. 
attracting capital. Capital goes where legal, political and military secu-
rity is, and this is all achieved by joining nATo.
nATo membership must be the future of this region, because the rest of 
Europe enjoys security, prosperity and peace. now is the time for people from 
Bosnia and Herzegovina to be given the same opportunity. 129
Finally, it should be emphasized that joining the nATo would greatly 
accelerate the process of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s admission to the European 
126 kovačević, D., «Bosnia’s Eleventh Hour Defense Reform», Transitions Online, 12 August 2003. 
127 poWeLL, C.L., «Press statement during the visiti to Sarajevo 31 July 2004», retrieved from the 
State Departmenta web site, http://www.state.gov/. 
128 General Sir Rupert Smith, Deputy Commander of Allied Forces in Europe, 1998-2002, inter-
view with Patrice McMahon u Boca Raton, Florida, 22 February 2002. 
129 Fenenko, A., «voronzeh državni univerzitet», Balkan Factor and European Security, interna-
tional Affairs, Blackwell Publishing, Chatham House, London, 2002, pp. 70-99. 
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union and other Euro-Atlantic institutions. namely, by fulfilling the condi-
tions for full membership in the European union, i.e. by fully introducing 
European standards and norms in all spheres of social, political, and economic 
life, Bosnia and Herzegovina would achieve internal stability and conduct 
the necessary democratization of institutions and the entire society. in other 
words, becoming member of the European union would remove all obstacles 
that prevent normal functioning of the state. in addition, harmonization of 
national legislation with the acquis communautaire would enable the building 
of democratic and market institutions and the establishment of direct business 
relations with companies in European countries.
European union membership, at the same time means entering the larg-
est single market in the world, with free movement of goods, labour, capital, 
services and knowledge, without fiscal, customs and other barriers. Entering 
the vast European financial market would open up significant investment op-
portunities, the development of agriculture, while small and medium-sized 
businesses would experience full momentum, and the state would connect 
with the transport and telecommunications European network, which would 
significantly reduce the unemployment rate in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Advantages of joining the family of European countries include access to 
economic, scientific, research, educational, cultural and other projects and pro-
grams. it would also pave the way for co-operation between universities and the 
economy, which would enable acquiring practical knowledge and experiences in 
order to improve the competitiveness of BiH young people. By joining the Eu, 
the fight against all forms of the most serious and organized international crime 
would be made much easier, and also enhance Bosnia’s own internal security, 
contributing to the collective security of the European union.
As before the war, Bosnia and Herzegovina was the demographic micro-
cosm of what Yugoslavia had been and could, in a way, be the pillar of such a 
renewed regionalism in much of the former Yugoslav space.
5. Bosnia and herzeGovina’s BrusseLs phase
The future of Bosnia and Herzegovina is certainly in the European un-
ion. Admission to the Council of Europe in early 2002 for Bosnia and Herze-
govina was the first step towards institutional integration into Europe. During 
the European union summit in Zagreb in october 2000, the role of further 
development of Bosnia and Herzegovina was given to the European union. 
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After joining the Council of Europe and starting the realization of the Road 
Map of the European union, it seems that in 2002 BiH firmly set off its jour-
ney from Dayton to Europe. 130
The Brussels phase marks the completion of the transition process from 
crisis management and stabilization to the process of building and strength-
ening the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its central institutions. Brus-
sels symbolizes the return and increasingly important presence of Europe in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the region and the end of uS hard diplomacy. 
namely, the Dayton phase of Bosnia and Herzegovina was characterized by 
the strong engagement of the united States and the frequent visits by its high 
officials, both civilian and military. on the other hand, the Brussels phase 
is characterized by little or no uS interest in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
the completion of the initial reform processes started after the signing of the 
Dayton Agreement and an increasingly active engagement, both political and 
financial, of the European union in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 131
130 The institutional relationship between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the European union began 
soon after the signing of the Dayton Agreement, in 1997 to be more precise, when the Eu 
Council of Ministers set up political and economic conditions for the development of bilateral 
relations. in March 2000, BiH received 18 conditions to be met in order to start negotiations on 
a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) within the Roadmap. Along the way to con-
cluding a Stabilization and Association Agreement, BiH had to answer 346 questions from the 
European Commission in the field of politics, economics and other relevant areas. The agree-
ment was signed in June 2008. in December 2002, pursuant to the Council of the European un-
ion Regulation 2666/2000, the CARDS Eu Technical Assistance Program for Reconstruction, 
Development and Stabilization was launched. The Council of the European union adopted the 
first European Partnership with Bosnia and Herzegovina in March 2004, and in January 2007 
the iPA instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance was established. Since 2011, the structural 
dialogues between the European union and BiH have begun in the field of politics and econom-
ics. in July 2015, a Reform Agenda was adopted aimed at solving the difficult socio-economic 
situation and improving the rule of law and public administration reform. A formal application 
for BiH membership in the European union was submitted on 15 February 2016. in December 
of the same year, BiH received the questionnaire from the European Commission. in February 
this year, BiH submitted answers to the European Commission’s questionnaire. The European 
union is institutionally present today in Bosnia and Herzegovina through the Delegation of 
the European union to Bosnia and Herzegovina, headed by the Special Representative. For 
more information, see the European Commission, Report on Bosnia and Herzegovina for 2016, 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Eu Enlargement Policy 
Release 2016, Brussels, 09 november 2016. http://dei.gov.ba/dei/media_servis/vijesti/default.
aspx?id=17696&langTag=bs-BA and Chronology of BiH-Eu Relations, Directorate for Euro-
pean integration BiH, http://dei.gov.ba/dei/bih_eu/default.aspx? id = 9808 & langTag = bs-BA.
131 chandLer, D., From Dayton to Europe, international Peacekeeping, Taylor & Francis Ltd, new 
York, Autumn 2005, pp. 167-181.
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in the past twenty years, international community has done a very im-
portant job in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 132 There has been significant progress 
in building state and society, progress made by the international community, 
but also by the country’s citizens. The physical and post-conflict reconstruc-
tion of the country was successful. Most of the laws adopted in the Parliamen-
tary Assembly of BiH are in the function of approaching Brussels. of the three 
state ministries that BiH had in 1997, there are now nine, as well as dozens of 
different state agencies. 133
However, we are still facing the burning problem of unemployment, cor-
ruption, organized crime and the lack of future prospect for young people. 
The implementation of international strategies is slow and complicated by 
various factors. under conditions of ambiguity characterized by the Dayton 
Agreement, complex institutional structures, a huge administrative appara-
tus, and too many levels of government, the implementation of vital reforms 
proved to be particularly complex. 134
i have repeatedly pointed out that for Bosnia and Herzegovina to con-
duct the necessary reforms it would need a renewed commitment from the 
international community. unfortunately, i believe that the European union 
itself will not be able to end the reform processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and make BiH truly modern, democratic and stable society. This is simply be-
cause of the fact that the removal of the structural deficiencies of the Dayton 
Agreement that prevent establishment of a functional and economicaly strong 
society and state cannot be carried out without its creator – the united States. 
Therefore, i believe that a strong and determined transatlantic partnership 
will be needed again as well as commitment to finish the process of making 
European union a whole.
The ultimate goal of BiH is to become part of an exclusive club of Eu-
ropean countries. The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina has prompted the Eu 
member states to rethink their common foreign and security policies and find 
new mechanisms to consolidate and strengthen these policies. Recognizing it 
or not, whether aware of it or not, the success of a united Europe will large-
132 mcmahon, P.C., «Rebuilding Bosnia: A Model to Emulate or to Avoid?», Political Science Quar-
terly, The Academy of Political Science, new York, 2004-05, pp. 7-36.
133 iBrahimaGić, o., Bosna i Bošnjaci poslije Dejtona, vijeće kongresa bošnjačkih intelektualaca, Sara-
jevo, 2000, pp. 25-271.
134 kampschror, B., «Though Bosnia’s war is long over, battle lines remain clearly...», USA Today, 
11 July 2005, p. 39.
EU Common ForEign and SECUrity PoliCy and BoSnia and HErzEgovina
AnuARio ESPAñoL DE DERECHo inTERnACionAL / voL. 35 / 2019 649
ly depend on the success of a strong, democratic and integrated Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Bosnia and Herzegovina is an inseparable part of Europe, ge-
ographically and historically, its past, present and future. overcoming all the 
challenges facing the European union today will go alongside the elimination 
of all obstacles to the normal functioning of the state of Bosnia and Herzego-
vina.
5.1.  The New Millennium U.S. Foreign Policy towards Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
The relationship between the united States and BiH towards the end of 
the 1990s was a characterized by serious u.S. military and diplomatic efforts 
– ending the war, preventing humanitarian catastrophe, signing the Dayton 
Agreement, establishing and maintaining peace, and building the state. 135 The 
president himself and the first State Department echelons were constantly 
engaged in BiH. Bosnia and Herzegovina is the most important foreign policy 
achievement of the Bill Clinton administration, which is still being praised by 
uS democrats. A small country with 3,500,000 people in the southeast of Eu-
rope has become a foreign policy priority of the united States. So it was until 
the beginning of the new millennium. 136
However, September 11 changed everything. uS foreign policy priori-
ties have been radically modified, and in those priorities there was no place 
for Bosnia and Herzegovina. in the years after 9/11, the absence of any seri-
ous, institutional interest of the united States in Bosnia and Herzegovina is 
evident. The only issue in which BiH is interesting for America is the fight 
against terrorism. 137 over the past two decades, the united States has been 
135 kokta, R. M., Sharing Risks, Burdens and Benefits: American Foreign Policy in the Balkans in the 1990s, 
Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Published by Frank Cass, London, maj 2003, p. 186.
136 hromić, H., Pregled vanjske politike SAD, Srednjoročni izgledi za zapadni Balkan: Konsolidacija 
sigurnosnih sistema i demokratske vlasti, Foreign Policy Review, vanjskopolitička inicijativa BiH, 
Broj 1, juni 2006, p. 205.
137 And this is precisely the context in which the united States today has an interest in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. The fact that there was the war over twenty years ago, that the process of internal 
and external integration has not yet been completed, that the reform process and the construc-
tion of society and the state have not been fully implemented, in other words, the state still faces 
significant problems, and that as such can become a potential target of terrorist organizations 
and the source of instability in the region. This is exactly the direction of efforts on the post-war 
building of the Bosnian society. 
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confronted with a number of foreign policy challenges – economic, political, 
security – and has lost interest in completing the work begun in Dayton. 138
The Arab Spring, Libya, Syria, iraq, iran, Afghanistan, north Korea, 
and Russia 139 have shadowed the genocide and ethnic cleansing in BiH and 
the agony that its citizens have been going through for the past two decades. 
Problems in the Middle East, terrorism and the preservation of the global 
uS supremacy have set the foreign policy priorities of the united States 
in the other direction, far from BiH. Bosnia and Herzegovina has simply 
become invisible to uS decision makers to such an extent that Europeans 
have become concerned that the united States might withdraw its troops 
from the region. 140 Still, they were promised that this was not an option. 
namely, in May 2001, the then Secretary of State Colin Powell, in an effort 
to reassure his nATo allies, said «we have started together and we will end 
together». 141
However, as the policy of the united States towards the region and Bos-
nia and Herzegovina went through several phases, recently, at least declar-
atively, there has been an intensification of the uS involvement in solving 
138  kapetanović, A., Vanjska politika BiH – između izazova i slabosti, Buybook, Sarajevo, 2005. 
139 in recent years, the growing geostrategic breakthrough of the Russian Federation towards the 
West has been evident. it seems that Russia has embarked on a strategic offensive to take over 
control of this part of the Balkans, and uses Serbia and smaller BiH entity, Republika Srpska, for 
achieving this goal. in other words, Moscow has decided to take over from the uS and the Eu 
a complete primacy in Serbia and the Republic of Srpska. Russian geostrategic and geopolitical 
penetration into the heart of the Balkans and Europe has caused deep concern both in the Eu 
and the uSA and they are already trying to prevent the arrival of the Russians in all ways. Re-
publika Srpska President Milorad Dodik is familiar with Russian plans and this is precisely 
the reason why he blocks reforms and constantly threatens with the referendum on the RS’s 
secession from BiH, for which has Moscow’s tacit support. Russia sees Serbia and Republika 
Srpska as a bridge between Moscow and Brussels, just as Britain is a bridge between Europe and 
America. in addition, Russia uses Serbia and Republika Srpska as a pawn through which it would 
play a more important role on the global political stage. Recovered and strong Russia, with still 
live images of the humiliation that it experienced from the West in the 1990s, is now determined 
to show, but also use its strength. Therefore, tensions between Russia and the West will likely 
continue in the near future, as Russia today decisively protects its interests. Bearing in mind the 
increasingly aggressive policy of Russia towards Bosnia and Herzegovina, the European union 
and the uSA may have, at least for the sake of their own interests in restricting geostrategic 
and geopolitical penetration of Russia, be more actively involved in the situation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.
140 Woodard, C., «in rebuilt Bosnia, no terror toehold», Christian Science Monitor, 24 March 2004, 
vol. 96, issue 82. 
141 Quoted in joseph, E.P., Back to the Balkans, new York, Foreign Affairs, Council on Foreign 
Relations, jan/feb 2005, pp. 111-122.
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the remaining problems in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although the current 
intensification of uS activities in the Balkans can be put into the context of 
the broader uS strategy in the fight against terrorism, as well as limiting the 
influence of Russia in this part of the world. it seems that the united States 
is ready, together with its European partners and allies, to firmly oppose all 
external destructive influences.
The first High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Carl Bildt re-
cently stated that after September 2001, and especially after the crisis in iraq, 
it is clear that «Europe and America have different priorities.» 142 However, he 
claims that the experience from the Balkans shows that «these priorities are 
complementary and mutually supportive... the 1989 priority of peace through 
economic integration, political state building and the expansion of the rule of 
law goes hand in hand with the 2001 priority of the fight against global ter-
rorism and the spread of mass destruction technologies.» 143 Similarly, former 
uS ambassador to the Eu, Richard Morningstar emphasizes that if we look 
at the Balkans, Europe and America can «come to the conclusion that when 
we work together everything is possible; when we are on opposite sides, the 
progress is missing.» 144
Judging by the statements by top uS officials, including former uS Sec-
retary of State Rex Tillerson, 145 vice President Mike Pence 146 and until re-
cently deputy assistant secretary of state for Europe and Eurasia, Hoyt Yee, 147 
the united States seem to be committed and determined to take a leading role 
in the Balkan region, i.e. together with partners from the European union, 
to complete the project of security integration, democratic transition and the 
completion of reform processes in BiH, in order for the country to prosper.
142 Quoted in GLiGorov, v., Iraq and the Balkans, WiiW Monthly Report, 3, 2003, p. 7. 
143  BiLdt, C., Peace Journey, The Struggle for Peace in Bosnia, London, Weidenfeld and nicholson, 
1999, pp. 24-5. 
144 Quoted in rhodes, A., Central Europe and Iraq: balance, bandwagon or bridge?, orbis, 48(3), 2004, 
p. 423. 
145 Tillerson Says u.S: Committed to European Security amid Russian Threat, Radio Free Europe, 
Radio Liberty, 28 november 2017, https://www.rferl.org/a/tillerson-european-security-rus-
sian-threat/28884642.html. 
146 Sewell Chan, Mike Pence in Montenegro Assures Balkans of u.S. Support, 2 August 2017. new 
York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/02/world/europe/pence-montenegro-mark-
ovic-nato.html. 
147 yee, H., Stability and Development of the Balkans are Extremely important, Sofia news 
Agency, novinite.com, 15 January 2018, https://www.novinite.com/articles/187030/Hoyt+Y-
ee%3A+Stability+and+Development+of+the+Balkans+Are+Extremely+important. 
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concLusion
Due to the inability to reconcile various, often contradictory, interests of 
the member states of the European union with regard to important foreign 
policy issues, the common foreign and security policy of the European union 
has so far achieved very limited results. numerous challenges that Europe 
is facing today, from Brexit, financial instability, terrorism, migration crisis, 
Trump policies on one hand and Putin on the other, make it less possible for 
the European union to achieve significant progress in the near future. What 
Europe needs today is strategically proactive thinking and predicting events, 
rather than reactive, often delayed postfestum action. There are a number of 
examples, such as Arab Spring, Brexit, migration crises, Crimea.
«... European union needs strong visionary leadership who will be able 
to deliver anticipatory governance and improve the Eu performance both 
internally and externally. The need for the Eu to act strategically in order 
to endure and play a global role seems to become a common narrative in the 
broad European foreign and security community» 148
Although respectable economic force, despite decades of efforts, it seems 
that the European union does not even have today a strong and stable common 
foreign and security policy, which would allow it to be a respectable, credible 
and influential factor in global foreign policy and security issues. Thanks to its 
economic power, European union could become a significant political force 
globally. «An Eu of nearly 400 million people and a combined gross domestic 
product (GDP) of more than $ 8 trillion that was able to unite its diplomatic and 
military potential could easily challenge the current status of united States as» 
lone superpower; «exert influence over the Middle East peace process and secu-
rity in the Persian Gulf... and, perhaps most importantly, create a new balance 
within a nATo alliance that currently dominates the united States.» 149
Foreign policy is a multilayered, multidimensional and extremely com-
plex area. Foreign policy, just like internal politics, is designed within the state, 
148 sus, M. (2017), Setting the scene for alternative future for European Union’s foreign policy 2015, 
Futures 97 (2018) 1-5, Elsevier, Hertie School of Governance, Germany, European union in-
stitute, italy. 
149 Gordon P. H., EU’s Uncommon Foreign Policy, The MiT Press, international Security, vol. 22, 
no. 3 (Winter 1997-1998), p. 77.
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but unlike internal policy, it is directed and must be implemented outside the 
state. 150 in fact, it represents behaviour of states vis-à-vis other states in the in-
ternational system, and its main goal is the protection of national interests, 151 
as well as preservation, survival and strengthening of the state’s power. 152
Foreign policy is a blend of politics, diplomacy, economy, trade and se-
curity – primarily energy security. We must not neglect cultural, historical, 
civilization, and religious values and interests. in the end, we can say that 
«foreign policy is a complex result of a complex process. it is the result of the 
struggle of competitive issues, competitive domestic interests and competi-
tive government agencies.» 153 in other words, there are many, very different, 
internal interests that lead countries when formulating foreign policy. if we 
add to this a wider geopolitical context at a certain historical moment, the 
relationship among the great world powers, as well as their interests we will 
get an intricate bench of different factors that significantly influence formu-
lation of the foreign policy of a state, and make it easier or more difficult to 
enforce it.
How is it possible then to formulate and implement common foreign 
and security policy of 28 different countries? in other words, how is it possi-
ble to reconcile and harmonize political, economic, security, cultural and all 
other interests of 28 different European union member states, in a modern 
environment in which foreign and security policy of states is lead and directed 
exclusively by national interests? it is difficult, but not impossible.
namely, as the borders of the European union expanded, achievement 
of the common foreign and security policy seemed to be less and less possible. 
The process of establishing common foreign and security policy of the Euro-
pean union was very painstaking; the Eu passed a pivotal path to the estab-
lishment of the CFSP. Along the way, the European union still experienced 
some progress and achieved good results, although not enough.
150 White, B., Analysing Foreign Policy: Problems and Approaches, Hants: Edward Elgar, 1989, p. 5. 
151 interest is the key word when it comes to the foreign policy of modern democratic states, includ-
ing Eu members and the biggest stumbling block in formulating a common Eu foreign and 
security policy, since it is very difficult to reconcile the interests of 28 states. Winston Churchill 
once said: We have no lasting friends, no lasting enemies, only lasting interests. https://www.
azquotes.com/quote/1421008, accessed 27 August 2018. 
152 janev, i., Međunarodni odnosi i spoljna politika – sa primjerom jugoslovenskih odnosa sa Ujedinjenim 
nacijama, institut za političke studije, Beograd: Čigoja štampa, 2002, pp. 16, 68-79. 
153 Howell, W.; pavehouse, J.C., While Dangers Gather: Congressional Checks on Presidental War 
Powers, Princeton university Press, 2007, p. 147.
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How can the European union achieve remarkable results in this area? 
What would it be a common denominator and a motivating factor in the es-
tablishment of CFSP? The answer is very simple and can be summarized in a 
few words – a policy guided by moral principles. it seems that moral principles 
and ethical values are completely marginalized or even lost in this modern 
world in which we live. Although it sounds utopian, the policy guided by mor-
al principles, which aims at the well-being of all humanity, can only and truly 
be the generator of a positive change, not only in the area of common foreign 
and security policy, but also on the global stage.
in order to achieve this, it is necessary to reject small, or not so small, 
individual, particular interests and resolutely start working in a spirit of com-
munion for the benefit of every human and every nation, at all times ready to 
compromise, ready to come out of our own perspective and even more reso-
lutely ready to look at every problem and situation from multiple perspectives, 
working of course in our own interest, but respecting the fears, will, desires 
and interests of others.
This, of course, applies to the common foreign and security policy of the 
European union towards Bosnia and Herzegovina as well. The situation in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina today, two decades after the end of the brutal war, 
is very complex and burdensome with many problems. The society and the 
state are faced with a number of serious challenges that threaten to endanger 
the very existence of the state. Different, ruling political options in BiH have 
different, very contradictory interests, which, unfortunately, are not aimed at 
strengthening the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the prosperity of all 
the people living there. We, the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot 
solve these problems by ourselves, nor can we get out of this situation. Despite 
the significant involvement of the European union in Bosnia and Herzego-
vina throughout its entire modern history, from the beginning of the 1990s 
to the present, BiH has failed both to build a democratic society and a stable 
prosperous state, and to adopt modern European standards in many segments 
of society and the state.
To achieve this, we need help and support of modern, democratic Eu-
ropean countries, a more determined engagement of the European union, 
today more than ever before, because of the future of the citizens of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, and all citizens of the European union.
